New Labour in government since 1997 has been roundly criticized for not possessing a clear, coherent and consistent democratic vision. The absence of such a grand vision has resulted, from this critical perspective, in an absence of Ôjoined-upÕ thinking about democracy in an evolving multi-level state. Tensions have been all too apparent between the governmentÕs desire to exert central direction Ñ manifested in its most pathological form as Ôcontrol freakeryÕ Ñ and its democratising initiatives derived from Ôthird-wayÕ obsessions with ÔdecentralisingÕ, ÔempoweringÕ and ÔenablingÕ. The purpose of this article is to examine why New Labour displayed such apparently impaired democratic vision and why it appeared incapable of conceiving of democratic reform Ôin the roundÕ. This article seeks to explain these apparent paradoxes, however, through utilising the notion of Ômacular degenerationÕ. In this analysis, the perceived democratic blind spot of New Labour at Westminster is connected to a democratic peripheral vision, which has envisaged innovative participatory and decentred initiatives in governance beyond Westminster.
prime minister, MPs of all parties, press commentators, and members of the public alike, were quick to invoke a vision of Ôour democracyÕ which was starkly counterposed to the images of mass murder on and below the streets of London, and to the mass protests on and around the streets of Scottish cities during the course of the G8 summit. What democracy looked like in this vision was a peaceful process of deliberation and compromise associated with parliamentary democracy. As the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, informed the House of Commons (HC) on the day of the London bombings: It is encouraging that right across every fragment of opinion in the House, we say that our democratic methods are the way to prevail and that we are determined to do whatever we must in order to ensure that those who seek to destroy that democracy are unable to carry out what they would wish (HC Debates, 7 July 2005, vol. 436, col. 469) .
But what were these ÔDemocratic MethodsÕ?
The vision of democracy subscribed to in the official statements of the New Labour government was clear and orthodox. In essence it was a simple and unmediated perspective of the Westminster model. Indeed, the continuing centrality of that model had been reaffirmed throughout LabourÕs period in office after 1997 and was captured succinctly in the official statement:
The United Kingdom is a Parliamentary democracy. Sovereignty rests with the Crown in Parliament. Law making rests with the tripartite sovereignty of Crown in both Houses of Parliament. In practice, the powers of the three parts are uneven. The House of Commons [has long] been established as the pre-eminent constitutional authority within the UK. The Government is formed by the Party which can command the support of the House of Commons. The Party which secures a majority [at a General Election] has the right to forma Government and, subject to sustaining its Parliamentary majority, to carry through the programme set out in its election Manifesto. Ministers are continuously accountable to the House of Commons through debates and votes; a process formalised and fortified by the role of the nonGovernment Parties in forming an Opposition, with the largest nonGovernment Party occupying the position of Official Opposition. This constitutional framework, founded on the pre-eminence of the House of Commons, has provided Britain with effective democratic Government and accountability for more than a century, and few would wish to change it (Cm5291, 2001, paras 13Ð17) .
It was no coincidence that the word ÔeffectiveÕ preceded the word ÔdemocraticÕ in the phrase Ôeffective democratic governmentÕ. Historically representative government in the UK has been conceived and functioned as a means of legitimating executive power (see Judge, 1993, 2; 2005, 28 ). An executive centric state has been justified in terms of a legislative-centric theory of parliamentary sovereignty. The practical pre-eminence of the executive in the UK state has thus been founded upon the theoretical Ôpre-eminence of the House of CommonsÕ. This has been the central paradox of the parliamentary state and has been routinely noted as the central dilemma confronting New LabourÕs programme of constitutional reform.
Westminster at the Centre: Loss of Central Vision
In the Westminster model the authority of government stems from its majoritarian position in the House of Commons. This majoritarian position marks the focal point of the state system. It is literally Ôthe centreÕ of government. However, from this position the vision of government is afflicted by a particular form of macular degeneration.1 A Ôblind spotÕ develops out of the conjunction of the two institutions ÔparliamentÕ and ÔgovernmentÕ into a blurred vision of Ôparliamentary governmentÕ. In this conjunction, the House of Commons is located at the centre of the political executiveÕs vision, yet superimposed upon, and ultimately obscuring, the view of parliament itself is the image of Ôstrong governmentÕ. In this manner, parliament and government are merged into a single, symbiotic image Ñ of parliamentary government. From this mono-focal perspective, the political executive loses sight of parliament as a discrete institution; and comes to see itself as simply the preeminent, majoritarian element of the representative lower House. In this sense, as Labour MP Graham Allen (2003, 20) notes, the House of Commons has become, in effect, a ÔHouse of GovernmentÕ. Another Labour MP, Tony Wright (2004, 867) , reinforces this view: ÔThere is a fundamental fact that in Britain, the executive is particularly strong and Parliament commensurately weak. Behind the constitutional rhetoric about the sovereignty of Parliament there lies the reality of executive dominance in a political system which concentrates power rather than divides itÕ.
In its acute form, governmental macular degeneration has revealed the symptoms of Ôelective dictatorshipÕ. The phrase was popularized by Lord Hailsham(1978, 22) in his analysis of a system in which Ôparliament is omnipotent, and since the government can rely on a majority in the Commons there are few effective limits to the powers of a government y Practically no other civilised country has invested its representatives with such unlimited authorityÕ (ibid., 101). If anything, this position has been perceived to have become even more acute under New Labour governments (see, for example, Power Inquiry, 2006, 128Ð135) .
Certainly with majorities of 178 and 167 after the 1997 and 2001 elections the policy preferences of government and the legislative outputs of parliament were unlikely to diverge to any significant degree. For a government elected on a Ôguiding rule not to promise what we cannot deliver; and to deliver what we promiseÕ (Labour Party, 1997, 2) , Ôgetting things doneÕ and Ôdriving forward reform, building lasting changeÕ (Blair quoted in Ludlam, 2004, 1) was at the heart of a continuing commitment to ÔBritish renewalÕ (Labour Party, 2001, 3) . Here was a government which proclaimed that it Ômade decisions because they were right Ñ not because they were destined to be popularÕ (ibid., 2005, 9) ; and made a virtue of making a ÔcovenantÕ (ibid., 1997, 1) with the electorate to be accountable for its record in government.
If New LabourÕs priority was thus to be afforded to ÔdeliveryÕ, its focus was upon efficiency and modernisation in government to achieve this objective. If the government already knew it was right, it did not wish to be impeded unnecessarily by other institutions, or people, telling it that it was not. Successive electoral victories in 1997 Successive electoral victories in , 2001 Successive electoral victories in and 2005 confirmed to the government, in its own collective mind at least, that the electorate had acknowledged that it was right; and the electoral system had provided the necessary majorities in parliament to confirm this ÔrightnessÕ. In this sense, the majoritarianism of the parliamentary system was not seen as a problem by New Labour governments, just as it had not been by any of its post-war predecessors. In this respect, New Labour governments after 1997 simply displayed the same symptoms of macular degeneration that had afflicted all post-war governments. For all governments, single party majoritarianism was not seen as a failing, but instead was deemed to be a virtue, of parliamentary democracy in the UK. What prevented single party majoritarianism from tipping over into single party dictatorship, in this view, was the chain of accountability linking governments to elected representatives in parliament and through themto the electorate at large.
Beyond Westminster, however, the degenerative symptoms afflicting the central vision of the executive were widely perceived. The related pathologies Ñ of executive mentality; conjoined party, legislative and executive leadership roles; the nature of party competition, and the executiveÕs risk-aversion to the media Ñ cumulated in the inversion of the idealised serial flow of accountability at the heart of the Westminster model and left a democratic blind spot at the centre of UK government.
Executive Mentality
An Ôexecutive mentalityÕ has long been observed by commentators (see Judge, 1981 Judge, , 1990 Judge, , 1993 Judge, , 2005 Flinders, 2002) . At one level it is ascribed to an instrumental logic of government. Reduced to its simplest formulation this logic assumes that all governments wish to implement their policy pledges as efficiently and as expeditiously as possible. What remains unclear, however, is why ÔefficiencyÕ would be privileged by ministers over ÔlegitimacyÕ derived from rigorous scrutiny? After all, the very same politicians, as shadow ministers, were only too aware of the democratic pathologies associated with ÔefficiencyÕ and ÔstrengthÕ of government.
One partial explanation is to be found in analyses, which focus on the personal characteristics and predilections of prime ministers over the past 25 years, and their preferences for Ôauthoritarian populismÕ (Mrs Thatcher) or Ôcontrol freakeryÕ (Mr Blair). The problem with this argument is to explain why the UK historically has been so unfortunate in its choice of prime ministers, as ÔauthoritarianÕ or ÔdictatorialÕ tendencies had been ascribed to PMs long before Mrs Thatcher and Mr Blair. Low (1904, 158) , for example, identified Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Disraeli and Gladstone as Ôcoming nearÕ to being dictators. Bogdanor (2003, 10) updated this list by noting that Balfour, Lloyd George, Neville Chamberlain, Churchill, Macmillan, Wilson and Heath had allegedly taken upon themselves, at various stages in their respective relationships with their own cabinet colleagues, powers Ônot inferior to that of a dictatorÕ. Such an extensive list suggests that explanations revolving around personality or individual agency are insufficient in themselves in explaining why a universal executive mentality develops in the UK. In which case, other structural and institutional explanations have to be examined as well. What becomes immediately apparent is that UK governments become locked into common modes, or trajectories, of behaviour and working routines (irrespective of party composition or the personal characteristics of leaders). These routines reflect the inter-institutional relationships at the heart of the Westminster model. In this sense, Ônew institutionalÕ notions of path dependency provide analytical purchase in trying to explain executive macular degeneration (see Judge, 2005, 9Ð15) . The paradox is that Ôthe pathÕ is determined beyond the executive itself. The basic institutional features of the Westminster model were captured in the governmentÕs formal statement noted above: the government is drawn from the House of Commons and derives its authority as the largest party in the House; and as long as it sustains this majority support the government has the right to implement its policy programme, subject to the scrutiny of, and its accountability to, elected representatives. Yet this simple institutional model, in sketching a serial flow of responsibility which links the governed to their governors, obscures a far more complex portrait of an interwoven institutional chain of elections, parties, legislature and executive. In this chain, the institutional characteristics of the executive are ÔdeterminedÕ successively and cumulatively by linkages of responsibility. Thus, if New Labour in government has obtained a reputation for Ôcontrol freakeryÕ, despite its pronouncements in opposition in favour of modernisation and democratisation, it is because of the institutional matrix within which it has to operate. It is worthwhile, therefore, disentangling the institutional strands of this matrix.
The first requirement of government is to win elections. In this respect, the Labour party has successfully transformed itself from its position, in the 1980s and early 1990s, as an electoral liability to one of electoral ascendancy by 2005 Ñ with New Labour winning three successive general elections and with its leader becoming the longest serving Labour PM. This transformation was effected both through ideological reorientation and an internal modernisation of the partyÕs organisational structure. Two parallel organisational reforms were undertaken: first, the party-trade union link was loosened; and, second, the leaderÕs autonomy from members was increased (see Quinn, 2004; Russell, 2005) . Cumulatively in opposition there was a drift towards Ôa more powerful central apparatus, greater organisational centralisation, more concentrated patterns of authority, and tauter disciplineÕ (Shaw, 2004, 67) . In part, the internal demand for greater discipline and coherence within the party reflected its external relationships with the electorate generally and also with a wider media culture specifically. This was a rapidly changing media culture in the 1990s and one characterised by: increased fragmentation and pluralism of media outlets; the advent of Ô24 hour newsÕ; the changing conventions of political coverage Ñ with disputation, rumour, and non-deference the preferred style Ñ and with Ôlaser journalismÕ premised upon a belief that politicians were Ôthe liars-in-chief, the gatekeepers of vaults of dirty big secrets that wait for the deployment of journalistic diligence and courage to be discoveredÕ (John Lloyd quoted in Bartle, 2005, 130) . In particular, as Cowley observes (2005, 10) :
Few members of the British media follow US President Herbert HooverÕs injunction that Ôhonest differences of views and honest debate are not disunity. They are the vital process of policy-making among free menÕ. Deviations fromthe party line are instead always pounced upon as evidence of disunity.
Thus, as Tony Blair noted early in his premiership, Ôill-discipline allowed us to be painted as extremist, out of touch and divided. It helped keep us out of power for 18 yearsÕ (The Independent, 20 November 1998) . If the relationship between New Labour and the media was defined before entry into office, the pathologies of this relationship were ultimately to become intertwined with the pathologies of the institutional relationship between legislature and executive. The obsession in the media with ÔsplitsÕ reflected an assumption of an adversarial, zero-sum political culture, and, in turn, came not simply to mirror but also to entrench that adversarial culture. Before examining this latter relationship it should be noted that even after its ideological transmogrification and organisational renewal New Labour remained an ideological ÔcoalitionÕ Ñ of remnants of ÔOld LabourÕ, social democratic revisionists, modernisers, and born-again Ôthird way-ersÕ. That these fractions continued to coalesce in a single party had much to do with the nature of the UKÕs first-past-the-post electoral system that rewarded the two major parties with disproportionate representation in the Commons, and routinely, disproportionate majorities for the governing party.
The style of electoral politics reflected a broader, national style of politics Ñ one that was characterized by Finer over 30 years ago as Ôadversary politicsÕ. Finer was in no doubt that this style was the Ôfruit of the two-party system, and this itself is the consequence of our electoral systemÕ (1975, ix) . The essence of this system was a Ôstand-up fightÕ with Ôrival teams of politicians in open contention which goes on before an election, during an election, and Ñ above all Ñ continues after the election, in the form of continuous polemic across the floor of the Commons where a powerless Opposition confronts an all-powerful GovernmentÕ (ibid., 3). The adversarial system, therefore, not only affects the style of electoral campaigning and reporting, but also impacts upon the organisation of parties and the nature of party competition (see Aspinwall, 2004, 4; McHugh and Parvin, 2005, 20) , as well as influencing the institutional relationship between parliament and the executive.
Executive and Legislature
Two basic features characterise the relationship between the executive and the legislature in the UK. The first is that the members of the political executive are drawn from the legislature. In other words, holding executive office and being a member of parliament (overwhelmingly an elected member) are coterminous positions. Second, political leadership positions in the executive are synonymous with leadership positions in the majority party. As Weir and Beetham (1999, 372) observe: ÔParliament, therefore, has little distinct life or identity of its own, separate from government and partyÕ. This conjunction of institutional leadership roles Ñ whereby leaders of the majority party simultaneously hold parliamentary and executive leadership roles (neatly encapsulated in the fact that the formal parliamentary office of Leader of the House of Commons is occupied by a cabinet minister) Ñ means that discrete party, parliamentary and executive norms are transmuted into an overarching Ôexecutive mentalityÕ. As the House of CommonsÕ Modernisation Committee noted: ÔMinisters are also Members of Parliament, and are sustained in office by ParliamentÕ and that Ôparty loyalty and organization structure the way in which Parliament and its institutions workÕ (HC 300, 2000, para 9 ). This conjunction (and confusion) was summarised by one reformist, former Leader of the House Robin Cook (2003, 153) :
Most MPs are deeply ambivalent about their primary role. MPs usually recognise that somewhere in their job description is a responsibility to protect the privileges and independence of Parliament. At the same time all MPs are elected on a party ticket and came to Westminster not as independents but as partisans. This dual identity of MPs ensures a constant struggle between the perception of the role of Parliament and their sense of belonging to a party fraction.
Routinely, the latter perception overrides the former. The norms of party loyalty are evident in a series of surveys and academic studies (see, for example, Searing, 1994; Rush, 2001; Cowley, 2002 Cowley, , 2005 . While these norms are not absolutes, it remains the case that the Ôoverwhelming desire on the part of the vast majority [is] not to do anything that might make their party appear dividedÕ (Cowley, 2002, 182) . Certainly the risk-aversion of modern executives in exposing themselves to hostile partisan and media criticism and Ôpolitical embarrassmentÕ has led them to prioritise party loyalty. But it also engenders an insularity and secretiveness at the core of the relationship between the executive and the legislature. When linked to the adversarial nature of parliamentary discourse and procedures, the prioritisation of party loyalty Ñ in the face of perceived threats of hostile, and potentially malicious, scrutiny from opposition parties and media alikeÑthe executive retreats into a Ôbunker mentalityÕ wherein: Ôwe are not going to tell [MPs] more than we can about what is going to discredit usÕ. These words were certainly issued by a Labour politician, and certainly could have been associated with New Labour, but, in fact, they are the words of James Callaghan some 25 years before Tony Blair came to power (Cmnd 5104, 1972) .
Inversion of Accountability
Risk-aversion, in the form of sensitivity to partisan embarrassment and fear of political ÔdiscreditingÕ, continues to underpin the normative system of the modern political executive. Although the revised Ministerial Code emphasises that ÔMinisters have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, decision and actions of their department and agenciesÕ (Cabinet Office, 2005a, 1.5 b) , and that they should be Ôas open as possible with Parliament and the publicÕ (ibid., 1.5d), the Code also propounds certain ÔprinciplesÕ which should guide the interactions of members of the executive with parliament. Ironically these principles are elaborated explicitly for only the most junior members of the executive, Parliamentary Private Secretaries, who are clearly advised that they are Ôexpected to support the Government in all divisionsÕ and Ôshould avoid associating themselves with recommendations critical or embarrassing to the GovernmentÕ (ibid., 2.9). Ministers themselves are simply cautioned that they are subject to the conventions of ministerial responsibility. Collective responsibility requires that ÔMinisters should be able to express their views frankly in the expectation that they can argue freely in private while maintaining a united front when decisions have been reached. This in turn requires that the privacy of opinions expressed in cabinet and ministerial committees should be maintainedÕ (ibid., 6.17). The expectation is that Ôonce a decision has been announced, it should be accepted without question or criticismÕ, and certainly ministers are expected to Ôavoid criticism of government policiesÕ (ibid., 4.6). In practice, however, such expectations often remained unfulfilled. Even the deputy prime minister, John Prescott, was accused of embarrassing the government in December 2005 in his public criticismof the governmentÕs education white paper (see The Sunday Telegraph, 18 December 2005, 4; The Evening Standard, 19 December 2005, 2; news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4539074.stm).
Similarly the constitutional convention of individual ministerial responsibility has provided Ôa strong determinant of the structural development of administrative organisation and therefore the style of governmentÕ (Radcliffe, 1991, 29) . Notions of individual ministerial responsibility have served not only to operationalise the external requirements of accountability, but have also served to sustain the internal organisational requirements of political control within departments (see Judge, 2005, 120Ð123) . Significantly, the ÔaccountabilityÕ of departmental ministers to parliament, and the cascaded relationships within departments stemming from this external accountability, have been based upon Ônormal rulesÕ of confidentiality pertaining to civil service advice (Cabinet Office, 2005a, para 2.14). In turn, these ÔnormalÕ internal rules have come to prescribe the external relationship between departments and Parliament: ÔCivil servants should not without authority disclose official information which has been communicated in confidence within the AdministrationÕ (Cabinet Office, 1999, para 10).2 Thus, a central paradox of the parliamentary state in the UK is the fact that the constitutional logic of the convention of ministerial responsibility Ñ of executive openness and accountability Ñ is inverted by a more immediate, pragmatic, political logic that serves to insulate executives from accountability (see Judge, 1993 Judge, , 2005 and ultimately to Ôeviscerate the participatory claims of reformersÕ (Flinders, 2002, 27) . In this inversion of accountability, the precipitants of executive macular degeneration are to be found.
Parliamentary Reform: Blind spot at the Centre of Parliamentary Democracy
When assessing New LabourÕs programme of parliamentary reform since 1997 it is important, as Tony Wright (2004, 868 ) counsels, to take into account the Ôunderlying realityÕ of executive dominance in a parliamentary system based upon the electoral competition of disciplined political parties. This is also a reality which blurs the notions of parliamentary government and parliamentary democracy, and in which reforms to enhance the capacities of government are often misperceived as enhancements of democracy.
For all that New Labour in office had an impressive record of reformist endeavour in Westminster (see Kelso, 2006) , the modernising agenda outlined in the 1997 manifesto remained unfulfilled by the time of the 2005 general election. Even LabourÕs own manifesto in 2005 acknowledged that there was still a pressing need to Ôcontinue to support reforms that improve parliamentary accountability and scrutinyÕ (Labour party 2005, 111) . Indeed, it could hardly argue otherwise. A broad consensus of opinion both inside and outside of Westminster was in no doubt that further reform was necessary. In its partisan guise, this sentiment was expressed in the Conservative manifesto thus:
Under Mr Blair the way we are governed has become less accountable, more complex and, ultimately, less democratic. The House of Commons has been steadily undermined, and proper reform of the House of Lords has been repeatedly promised but never delivered. The House of Commons needs to be made more capable of standing up to the executiveÕ (Conservative party, 2005, 21) .
In a more academic formulation this view found expression in Brazier et al.Õs (2005, 78) conclusion that: Ôdespite some improvements, Parliament remains in many ways an inefficient and, some would allege, largely ineffective institution while there have been some important changes in the relationship between the executive and Parliament, it remains clear that the balance of power remains firmly in the lap of the formerÕ. Similarly, in his assessment of the record of New LabourÕs parliamentary modernisation programme, Tony Wright drew a distinction between Ômodernisation as efficiencyÕ Ñ which was Ôfavoured by governmentsÕ and was Ôessentially executive-mindedÕ Ñ and Ômodernisation as scrutinyÕ Ñ which Ôwants to shift the balance between the executive and legislature in significant respectsÕ and which Ôis much less attractive to governmentsÕ (2004, 869Ð870) . Not surprisingly Wright concluded that the former kind of modernisation had prevailed over the latter (see also House of Commons, 2005a; Kelso, 2006) .
Where the Ôblind spotÕ of the New Labour government was most apparent was in the consistency with which it defended the convention of ministerial responsibility Ñ but in a defensive and insular formulation. This formulation was particularly evident in the executiveÕs interactions with select committees. On the one hand, the government committed itself to openness and accountability and advised civil servants appearing before select committees that:
The central principle to be followed is that it is the duty of officials to be as helpful as possible to Select Committees. Officials should be as forthcoming as they can in providing information care should be taken to ensure that no information is withheld which would not be exempted if a parallel request were made under the FOI Act (Cabinet Office, 2005b, para 53 ).
Yet, on the other hand, officials were also counselled that they should:
as far as possible confine their evidence to questions of fact and explanation relating to government policies and actions. Officials should as far as possible avoid being drawn into discussion of the merits of alternative policies where this is politically contentious (ibid., para 55).
The general debilitating effects of this prohibition upon parliamentary scrutiny of executive actions had been apparent since the inception of the select committee system in 1979 (see Judge 1981 Judge , 1983 Judge , 1993 Judge , 2005 .More specific and contemporary effects were noted, however, in the contrast between the access to information afforded to the Hutton and Butler Inquiries and that afforded routinely to select committees (HC 446, 2004, para 87) . While the House of CommonsÕ Liaison Committee was convinced that it was only Ôreasonable to expect that select committees should receive Government co-operation as fully as an inquiry set up by the government itselfÕ (ibid., para 89), the executiveÕs actions continued to confound this reasonable expectation. Thus, despite its undertakings to be as Ôforthcoming and helpfulyin providing informationÕ (Cabinet Office, 2005b, para 9), and especially to allow special advisers to appear before select committees (HC 1180 (HC -I, 2004 q26; Cabinet Office, 2005b, para 44) , in practice the government continued to display a reluctance to allow open access to Ôthose at the centre of government who are called on to advise on those public policy issues affecting the whole of governmentÕ (HC 690, 2005, para 12) . The unwillingness of the Prime Minister in particular to permit key advisers (most notably Lord Birt in late 2005)3 to give evidence to committees elicited the damning response of the Public Administration Committee:
In refusing to allow its special advisers to appear before the Committee on inquiries which are directly germane to their work, the Government, and No. 10 in particular, has failed to live up to its undertakings. This is hampering, unnecessarily, the ability of Parliament to undertake effective scrutiny (ibid.).
The exasperation of the chairmen of select committees shone through in the question posed to the PM in his appearance before the Liaison Committee in November 2005:
Parliament is supposed to be the focal point of accountability for ministers and yet we cannot get anything like the volume of information nor the easy access of witnesses that were provided to Hutton and Butler. Can you not see that leads to the impression that if you want to get a proper inquiry you have to go outside Parliament because the Government will not co-operate with its internal inquiries? (HC 709-i, 2005, q9) . Oppositions talk of freedom of information. They tend to forget that talk when they become governments. We did not. From 1 January 2005, we introduced a legally enforceable freedom of information regime (The Guardian, 31 December 2005).
Lord Falconer went on to state that ÔGood government is open governmentÕ. Though he also noted that there was a case for the Ôlegitimate retention of information in order to promote good government in the public interestÕ. In essence, his argument reflected the orthodoxy of all UK executives: ÔIt does not promote good government toypublish details of ongoing internal policy discussion where people express their views and advice on the basis it is confidential. Governments of all political stripes need the space to govern for all of the publicÕ (The Guardian, 31 December 2005).
Due praise was afforded to the New Labour government on passing the FOI Act, and in responding to 19,374 FOI requests received by government departments under the Act in its first year (in total 37,849 requests were received by 42 government bodies in 2005, see Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2006, 17) . Predictably, however, there were concerns about the implementation of the Act and the speed with which requests were processed. Even more predictably, perhaps, there was consternation at the significant limitations upon disclosure of information that remained. Under Section 35 of the 2000 Act, for example, there are class-based exemptions relating to the formulation or development of government policy; ministerial communications; the provision of advice by any of the Law Officers; or the operation of any ministerial private office. In effect, such exemptions left Ôcontrol over large tracts of information, much of it exactly the information that the public and press would need to have access to in order to hold government to account, in the hands of ministersÕ (Oliver, 2003, 167 ; see also Evans, 2003, 208Ð214) .4
Human Rights Act
Notions of ÔcitizenshipÕ link the issues of open government and human rights in the minds of many advocates of increased democratisation in the UK (see Wright, 1994; Evans, 2003, 158Ð163, 177Ð180; Oliver, 2003, 160Ð161, 124Ð130) . In this approach Ôindividuals are rights bearers as well as citizens in a political communityÕ (Oliver, 2003, 160) . Historically, however, the Labour party had subscribed to the view that Ôthe protection of rights was a matter for Parliament: individual rights were to be won in Parliament and to be secured and preserved thereÕ (Ewing, 1999, 81) . In moving from this historic stance, at least one commentator found it Ômost remarkableÕ that Ôno leader of New Labour, which had engineered the assault on parliamentary sovereignty which the Human Rights Act (HRA) represented, was prepared to articulate an accepted revised philosophyÕ (Stevens, 2002, 135) . Indeed, it is worth examining the two parts of StevensÕ statement sequentially: to determine the extent to which, first, there was an Ôassault on parliamentary sovereigntyÕ; and, second, why a revised philosophy would remain unarticulated.
From the outset, New Labour did not seek a frontal assault on parliamentary sovereignty but rather sought to Ôdeliver a modern reconciliation of the inevitable tension between the democratic right of the majority to exercise political power and the democratic need of individuals and minorities to have their human rights securedÕ (the then Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine, House of Lords Debates, 3 November 1997 , vol. 582, col. 1234 . When the needs of the latter conflicted with the requirements of the former (in the form of a majority party exercising political power) then ÔreconciliationÕ was heavily skewed in the formerÕs favour. In fact, the example of New LabourÕs antiterrorist legislation neatly encapsulated the nature of ÔreconciliationÕ between the exercises of executive power and the human rights of individuals and minorities.5
In introducing its human rights legislation the government was adamant that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty had not been infringed. Nonetheless, when introducing the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005, the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, acknowledged that the HRA had engendered a new, more complex, reality of the relationship between the judiciary, the executive and parliament:
What I do think is that when the Law Lords of this country make a set of criticisms [ruling that section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights] about the way that we are operating that is well founded, by a vote of eight to one, it is incumbent on the GovernmentÑand I would argue on ParliamentÑto respond to that and decide how to deal with it (HC Debates, 23 February 2005, vol. 431, col. 346) .
What was equally apparent during the passage of New LabourÕs anti-terrorism measures was that the government did not welcome critical parliamentary ÔresponsesÕ, especially those from the House of Lords, about the unprecedented scope of the powers of the new legislation. Although the government was insistent that the new legislation was Ôfully compatibleÕ with the European Convention on Human Rights, it encountered significant and sustained parliamentary opposition in both Houses precisely because of concerns about ÔcompatibilityÕ. Indeed, so great was the opposition to a proposed clause extending the period of pre-charge detention to 90 days that the New Labour government suffered its first defeats in a vote in the House of Commons in November 2005. What the defeats illustrated were the intertwined and variable interinstitutional interactions between party, legislature, executive and judiciary.
What is of particular importance for present purposes, however, was the response of the Prime Minister to defeat in the House of Commons. Mr BlairÕs belief, noted earlier, on being right, and its corollary of impatience with parliamentary opposition, was reflected in his linked statements: ÔSometimes it is better to do the right thing and lose, than to win doing the wrong thingÕ; and Ô[t]he country will think parliament will have behaved in a deeply irresponsible way. I have no doubt about that at allÕ (quoted in The Guardian, 10 November 2005). This response resonated with an executive mentality, to such a degree that Andrew Rawnsley observed that Mr Blair Ôspoke less like a prime minister in a parliamentary system of government and more as an American president might scorn an obstructive CongressÕ (The Observer, 13 November 2005). In part Mr BlairÕs sanguine reaction was also based on the partisan calculation that the Conservatives (and Labour rebels) might yet be haunted by their actions in the face of some future terrorist attack. Indeed, the partisan dimension of the development of anti-terrorist measures became more pronounced after the two defeats suffered by the government in February 2006 on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. The Home Secretary noted that: ÔI actually think that what happened was a purely political act by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and some of the people on the Labour side to try and deliver a defeat to the government rather than a genuine consideration of the issuesÕ (BBC News, 1 February 2006). The Home Office minister, Paul Goggins, echoed the earlier words of the Prime Minister: ÔWe have some choices to take in the weeks and months ahead about whether the political objective of the House of Commons is to defeat the government at every possible opportunity or whether it is to get the right policiesÕ (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4668868.stm). 
Peripheral Vision: Democracy Below the UK Parliament
While macular degeneration results in reduced central vision, good peripheral vision is generally retained. An analogy can thus be drawn with New LabourÕs approach to government and democracy Ôbeyond the centreÕ in the case of devolution and decentralisation. In The Third Way Giddens argued the case for the Ôdemocratisation of democracyÕ and that such democratization Ôfirst of all implies decentralisationÕ (1998, 72) . While the Ôthird wayÕ vision does not deny the need for Ôstrong governmentÕ, a Ôkey challenge of progressive politicsÕ is how to Ôuse the state as an enabling force, protecting effective communities and voluntary organisations and encouraging their growth to tackle new needs, in partnership as appropriateÕ (Blair, [1998 (Blair, [ ] 2003 . New Labour in ÔThird Way modeÕ is thus Ôat ease with establishing a strong range of cross checking institutions at different levels of governance and ensuring that those institutions are open and accountable and capable of working alongside private, voluntary and community interestsÕ (Stoker, 2002, 431) . There can be no doubt that New Labour in power has been pro-active, even hyper-active, in pursuing democratisation beyond the centre.
Devolution
Devolved government was never likely to involve an institutional year zero, shaking off institutional continuities from the UK system of government, as some hoped (Mitchell, 2004, 35) .
Nonetheless, the hopes of Ôthird wayÕ acolytes within New Labour were rooted in a conviction that: ÔThe centralisation of decision making in Britain today [was] absurdÕ (Mandelson and Liddle, 1996, 187) . In this sense old continuities had to be fractured as the Ôcloser politics Ñ and power Ñ is to people, the more chance there is of interaction between them. And that is what democracy is aboutÕ (ibid., 197). Here, indeed, was a conception of democracy that was consciously counterposed to the established Westminster model and which was designed to generate, ultimately, an inclusionary and participatory Ônew politicsÕ. Yet, this was not a peculiarly New Labour vision as it was shared, especially in Scotland, by a range of other parties and civil society organisations. What was clear, however, was that there was to be an explicit attempt to move away from the adversarial politics of Westminster and to inculcate Ôgrown-up, civilizedÕ behaviour in Edinburgh (Anne Begg, HC Debates, 13 January 1998, vol. 304, col. 177).
The subsequent intent and achievements of the Labour government should not be underestimated: a Parliament in Scotland and Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland were rapidly established (even if the latter was in suspension after October 2002); and the cause of regional government was promoted in the institutional formof the Greater London Authority and the initiation (albeit stuttering and soon stalled) of a process of regional devolution in England. Indeed, within a very short period what was notable was the Ônormalisation of devolved governance in Scotland and WalesÕ (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005, 301) . If the term ÔnormalizationÕ is accepted then overall assessments about ÔsuccessÕ or ÔfailureÕ of devolution can be side-stepped here, and all that needs to be remembered in the following discussion is that any serious evaluation of devolution has to be ÔnuancedÕ (Trench, 2004, 1) .
What is important to note, however, is that, in the exercise of ÔnormalÕ postdevolutionary politics, the symptoms of executive macular degeneration associated with the Westminster model came to be reproduced in mutated form in devolved institutions. The initial clear vision of the Ônew politicsÕ showed signs of progressive impairment as a result of the genetic institutional inheritances from the Ôold politicsÕ. Clearly, the designers of the new representative institutions in Scotland and Wales consciously sought to inculcate novel values and norms, and to work from an institutional blueprint, that explicitly did not replicate the Westminster model. Yet, in trying to import the values of participation, inclusion, openness and cooperation into the new representative institutions in Scotland and Wales, the designers both misread the Westminster model and underestimated the inherent tension between popular inclusion and exclusion in the very nature of representative democracy (see Judge, 2005) .
One consequence of this misreading was that the inclusionary vision of democratised Scottish governance became blurred.6 Assessments of the extent to which a new politics based upon a Ôparticipatory idealÕ have intruded into Scottish governance have concluded that when Ômeasured in terms of political powerÕ participatory initiatives associated with the Scottish parliament Ôappear more symbolic than effectiveÕ (Mitchell, 2004, 39 ; see also Bonney, 2003) . More strikingly, there was a dawning realisation among the more na•ve proponents of the Ônew politicsÕ that Ôin the end, the decisions of the Parliament have to be made by elected representativesÕ (Bonney, 2003, 467) . If notions of representative democracy were once more to be privileged in this manner, the genetic constitutional Ôstemcell Õ from which such notions derived in the first instance Ñ the Westminster model Ñ held the potential to be reproduced in modified form in the devolved institutions.
Indeed, the symptoms of adversarial politics have been apparent in Scotland. Arter (2003, 18) , for example, concluded that the relationship between the majority Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition that formed the Executive and the leading opposition party, the Scottish National Party, had been Ôquintessentially adversarialÕ. He proceeded to note that this relationship had been sustained by the Ôground rules of the Westminster gameÕ. Hence, the parties in the executive coalition have expected the loyalty of their respective MSPs and have sought to enhance discipline in parliament through intra-party rule changes (see The Sunday Herald, 23 October 2005). Recognition that Ôpower lies in the coalition at least so long as the coalition acts cohesivelyÕ has contributed to a ÔremarkableÕ rarity of Executive defeats by Parliament (Mitchell, 2005, 37) ; and, overall, the Ôtight grip of partiesÕ has been adjudged to have Ôreduced the liberating potential of devolutionÕ (Keating, 2005, 218) . When transposed into the legislative process, there is evidence that the Ôground rulesÕ are contributing to Ôclassic Executive dominance in Scotland that could be used to support the arguments of the Ôold politicsÕ campÕ (Shephard and Cairney, 2004, 854) .7 In November 2005 the Scottish political editor of The Herald observed that Ôquietly in the background something is going badly wrong with parliament legislationÕ (The Herald, 15 November 2005) . What was happening was that the rights of ordinary MSPs to introduce Ônon-executive billsÕ were being curtailed. Similarly, the over-optimistic predevolution consensus, which envisaged a Ômore active legislature which directed the budget as part of a Ônew politicsÕÕ (Midwinter, 2005, 28) , was inhibited by the inheritance of Ôa classic incremental budgetary system from Westminster in which parliamentary scrutiny was minimalÕ (ibid., 13).
One further inheritance of Ôold politicsÕ was reflected in the press coverage afforded to the new parliament. A persistent theme of press reporting has been the uncovering of ÔscandalsÕ in parliament and the executive Ñ most of which were trivial in their own right but generated significant coverage. As Keating (2005, 93) observes, there has also been an Ôalmost universal tendency to describe devolution as a disappointment and a failureÕ. From the outset the issue of the new parliament building contributed to this sense of failure and plagued the new parliament throughout its first four-year term, as the costs spiralled from an initial estimate of d40 million to over d430 million by the time the building was officially opened in October 2004. For many in the Scottish media the intricacies of the architectural design and subsequent problems with construction on the Holyrood site served as a metaphor of the inherent deficiencies of the devolution project itself. The political inhabitants of the building were also subject to withering scrutiny, with MSPs widely dismissed as political pygmies or second-rate politicians. This concern with individuals rather than issues and with scandals rather than serious debate was epitomised in the circumstances leading to the resignation of the Conservative party leader David McLetchie in November 2005. Academics and journalists alike voiced concern that the use of FOI requests for taxi receipts had Ôtrivialized Holyrood and demonized MSPsÕ (Sunday Herald, 6 November 2005; also see Ruaridh Nicoll, The Guardian, Media, 6 November 2005).
If one of the objectives of devolution was to reverse an apparent decline in both popular trust and confidence in the political process in Scotland and to increase electoral participation then Ôdevolution has not helped to reconnect the public with the way they are governedy it simply has not made much difference one way or the otherÕ (Curtice, 2004, 233) . Moreover, focus group research conducted for the Arbuthnott Commission (2006, 69) found that, even after the introduction of the Scottish parliament, there remained Ôa deep distrust amongst many citizens, particularly younger ones, of established politics and the relevance of votingÕ. Generally, the Commission found high levels of political disengagement and cynicism. Indeed, there was the irony that research, undertaken on behalf of the Commission, found: Ôthere was a widespread assumption amongst those interviewed that the MP [rather than the MSP] is the most important representative for their areaÕ (George Street Research, 2005, ii) .
Local government
If the Ôthird wayÕ vision is clear Ñ that there should be Ôexperiments with democracyÕ (Giddens, 1998, 775) to re-establish contacts between citizens and government Ñ then, given that local government accounts for approximately 80 per cent of state-citizen contacts annually (Stoker, 2002, 422) , localities would appear to be the obvious place to focus these experiments. Unquestionably, New Labour in power has actively pursued a Ôradical programme of democratic renewalÕ (Wilson and Game, 2002, 354) .8 This ÔmodernisationÕ programme has included: new modes of citizen consultation and engagement (through citizensÕ juries; focus groups, citizensÕ panels, deliberative opinion polls, and local referendums); modernisation of electoral arrangements (through the adoption of PR in Scottish local authorities; all postal vote ballots, electronic voting and counting, and e-democracy initiatives); and modernisation of council organisational structures (through elected mayors, cabinet models, and local strategic partnerships). The actual impact of these initiatives, however, is open to dispute; as what is far from clear is the extent to which any of these initiatives Ôoffer participants a meaningful route to making a difference to the ultimate outcomeÕ (Sullivan, 2004, 195) . Leaving aside an evaluation of the actual enhancement of local democracy since 1997 (for sceptical reviews see for example Lownes and Wilson, 2003; Sullivan et al., 2004; Dinham, 2005) , the true significance of the Ôlocal experimentsÕ with democracy is that they were conducted at all by a New Labour government accused of Ôcontrol freakery gone madÕ (Stoker, 2002, 430) .
One explanation is that the discourse of local modernisation simply Ôprovided a convenient smokescreen for LabourÕs centralising and hence authoritarian tendencies: it gave the excuse to tell local authorities what to doÕ (Coulson, 2004, 472) . But this overstates the case, as New Labour had a clear vision of the value of democratisation that was not to be obscured by any such ÔsmokescreenÕ. A more considered analysis would direct attention to the possibility that democratic renewal was about restoring trust and confidence in local democracy and especially local representative institutions. In this sense Ôlocal democracy referred to the quality of the relationship between local authorities and their communities and service users Ñ and not the degree of autonomy or level of capacity enjoyed by elected councilsÕ (Lowndes and Wilson, 2003, 290) . This point is neatly captured in Wilson and GameÕs (2002, 353) observation that:
Led by Deputy Prime Minister and Environment Secretary John Prescott, ministers were keen from the outset to emphasise their genuine belief in and commitment to a strong, democratically elected local government. Things would be very different under Labour but they, as ministers in a popularly elected national government, would be the ones deciding just how different things would be.
Conforming to a power dependency model of central-local relations, New Labour in government did not seek to reduce its capacity to formulate and drive through its local initiatives. In this regard it retained a Ôtop down, rule bound, control orientationÕ (Stoker, 2002, 430 ). Yet, from this centralist orientation or perspective, where its own scope for policy discretion was secure, New Labour displayed a clear Ôperipheral visionÕ of the need for bottom-up processes of democratisation at the local level.
This bottom-up perspective has also been apparent in a range of decentralized, participatory initiatives in the provision of other public services. One of the most visible was the Department of HealthÕs Your Health, Your Care, Your Say consultative process which preceded the drafting of the 2006 White Paper Our Health, Our Care, Our Say (Cm6737). In the autumn of 2005, four regional deliberative forums were convened Ñ billed as Ôlistening eventsÕ Ñ to enable local people to discuss the future of the health and social care services. The consultation process culminated in a ÔCitizenÕs SummitÕ in Birmingham on 29 October 2005. At this ÔsummitÕ 998 people, drawn from across England, met to discuss and vote on a range of options about the priorities, choices and type of health and care provision in the early 21st century. As such it was the Ôbiggest public consultation of its kind ever held in BritainÕ. While participants were selected to reflect a cross section of the population, special effort was made to Ômake sure that the views of people who donÕt always get involved in this kind of consultation were heardÕ (see www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/12/27/68/04122768.pdf).
Ultimately, however, the real test of such processes remains that: Ôparticipation and inclusion are only meaningful if peopleÕs views can be seen to make a difference and to influence the development of policyÕ (HcHugh and Parvin, 2005, 15) . In an effort to ÔpassÕ this test, Health ministers met in March 2006 with 100 participants who had attended the original deliberative events in order to explain the policies outlined in the White Paper. This follow-up event was entitled ÔHolding the Government to AccountÕ. Ministers took this opportunity to Ôpresent how the Government had included many of the suggestions made by the public during the 2005 listening eventsÕ (www.dh. gov.uk/NewsHome/YourHealthYourCareYourSay/YourSayArticle/fs/en? CONTENT_ID=4131703&chk=tDPIyT). Equally, in the White Paper itself, ministers also took the opportunity to explain why the views of participants had not been accepted on some important issues (see Cm 6737, 2006, paras 2.28, 8.13 ).
Connected Blind Spot and Peripheral Vision: Electoral Reform
Nowhere is the connection between New LabourÕs central democratic blind spot and its clear participatory peripheral vision better illustrated than in the view of electoral reform adopted by governments since 1997. In November 2005 an Electoral Choice Bill was introduced, as a 10minute Rule Bill in the House of Commons, by Labour MPs John Denham and David Chaytor and by the Liberal Democrat MP Nick Harvey. With no hope of translation into legislation, the Bill was designed to publicise the failure of New Labour to reform the system for Westminster elections and to suggest mechanisms whereby a referendum on electoral reform could be prompted without having to wait for the government to call such a referendum. Despite manifesto pledges in 1997 and 2001 to hold a referendum and to revisit this issue after a review of the operation of non-Westminster electoral systems, New Labour in power had managed to obscure electoral reform from its central vision. Indeed, as Kavanagh et al. note (2006, 399Ð400) : ÔAs of 2006, PR is effectively off the agenda and there is little prospect of a referendum in the near future. [Many New Labour ministers still calculate that the established electoral arrangements, a key part of the traditional Westminster system and its underpinning elitism, still operates in their interestsÕ.
In essence, however, this ÔcalculationÕ was restricted to the centre; for, in its peripheral vision, New Labour was more than willing to identify the democratic case for electoral reform and to experiment with a variety of different systems (even if implementation of such reform reflected more expedient partisan concerns). Elections to the European Parliament are based upon a regional list system with counting by the dÕHondt method. The Scottish Parliament, the Welsh National Assembly, and the Greater London Authority are elected under the Additional Member System (with different proportions of list members in each institution); the single transferable vote (STV) is used in all elections in Northern Ireland except those for Westminster; from 2007 local authority elections in Scotland will be conducted by STV; and Mayoral elections in England use the Supplementary Vote system. Far from being ÔblindÕ to the virtues of electoral reform, therefore, New Labour has possessed an extensive vision, some would argue too wide-ranging a vision, in its implementation of a raft of diverse electoral systems.
The fact that Scotland alone had four different systems in operation in 2006 not only revealed the reality of Ômulti-level governanceÕ but also reflected the complexities attendant upon the asymmetric and piecemeal implementation of voting reforms. Indeed, concern over these complexities and asymmetries led to the appointment of the Arbuthnott Commission in May 2004 to consider the impact of the multiplicity of voting systems and differences in constituency boundaries upon voter participation. While the CommissionÕs final report found no evidence that multiple voting systems or different boundaries confused voters to the extent of deterring electoral involvement (Arbuthnott Commission, 2006, para 2.18) , it did find considerable ignorance of all voting systems apart from first-past-the-post. Yet the Commission concluded that the Ôcase for introducing a more proportional system fory [Westminster] elections is now very strong, since after 2007 they will be the only ones held in Scotland which do not involve a significant degree of proportionalityÕ (ibid., para 2.17).
Yet, if there is no direct correlation between voting system and turnout Ñ given that voters tend to be equally ignorant of the mechanics of all systems apart from the first-past-the-post Ñ then New Labour might feel justified in arguing that the focus of attention for Westminster elections should be upon encouraging electors to cast their vote in the first place rather than upon the technical processes by which votes were counted. Certainly New Labour had no doubts that Ôit is the role of Government to be concerned about the condition of our democracyÕ (Harman, 2006) . Indeed, given the historically low turnouts at the 2001 and 2005 general elections in the UK, the government could hardly be anything other than ÔconcernedÕ about democracy in the UK. The view of New Labour in government as to Ôwhat democracy should look likeÕ was that democratic legitimacy was based upon three electoral propositions: Ôeveryone who is eligible to vote having the right to vote; people who are entitled to vote actually wanting to vote; and no one fiddling the voteÕ (ibid.). These principles found legislative form in the Representation of the People Act 2000, which allowed voters to request a postal vote in any statutory election in Britain and enabled local authorities to pilot schemes for electoral arrangements, most importantly for all postal ballots. The European Parliamentary and Local Elections (Pilots) Act 2004 sanctioned further pilots in four regions in the combined European and local government elections on 10 June 2004. More broadly, the Electoral Administration Act 2006 sought, amongst other things, to improve the electoral registration process, enhance information and publicity about the elections, ease access to voting stations, provide stronger deterrents for electoral fraud, improve the effectiveness of the administration of elections, enhance participation through reducing the age of candidacy from21 to 18, and simplify the rules for candidates and political parties.
New LabourÕs concern with electoral processes also found institutional form in the creation of the Electoral Commission in November 2000. Under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 the Commission was charged with keeping electoral law and practice under review, as well as monitoring and evaluating local election pilot schemes, and increasing understanding of, and participation in, the democratic process. The Commission was also required to report on the administration of all major elections. As part of this reporting exercise, the Commission has paid particular attention to the issue of turnout and the specific theme of the electoral disengagement of young people (see Electoral Commission, 2002 . Alongside this institutional commitment to the enhancement of electoral democracy New Labour has also been keenly aware of the fact that: ÔOur democracy lacks legitimacy if, whatever the formal rules about universal suffrage and the right to vote, people donÕt make it a reality by turning out to voteÕ (Harman, 2006) . What was of particular concern was the development of Ôdemocracy desertsÕ in certain areas of the UK; where the problems of social exclusion were compounded by low levels of democratic engagement as manifested in low levels of registration and low levels of turnout. The dilemma highlighted in these areas was that the citizens who were most dependent on the state, and were most directly affected by redistributive policies, were precisely those who were least likely to be engaged in the electoral and other participatory processes.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to review the democratic vision of New Labour in government since 1997. Many critics would argue that this is a futile task as the projection of such a vision has not been part of the New Labour project and, in fact, successive Blair governments have served to undermine the historic image of representative democracy in the UK (see Norton, 2004, 544) . But this is not the conclusion reached here. Indeed, if New Labour warrants criticismit is not for failing to have a vision of where it is going but rather of having two distinct visions of democracy that coexist in an uneasy, and often paradoxical, relationship. The contention of this article has been that New Labour in government has displayed, on the one side, an orthodox, centralized vision encapsulated in the ÔWestminster modelÕ; yet, on the other, has simultaneously projected a Ôthird wayÕ image based on a Ôdeepening and widening of democracyÕ; of Ôenabling governmentÕ; and of Ôdouble devolutionÕ (Giddens, 1998; Miliband, 2006) . In the eyes of many of New LabourÕs critics this is a Ôrose-tintedÕ peripheral vision, one that fails to compensate for the central blindspot of the Westminster vision (see Morrison, 2001, 501) , and one that raises questions about the compatibility of indirect/representative and direct/participatory democratic principles and practice. As a result, governments since 1997 have displayed the classic symptoms of institutional macular degeneration: with a blind spot at the centre (Westminster) yet with clear peripheral vision (both in terms of decentralisation and participation beyond Westminster).
What is striking is that, after almost a decade in power, the Westminster model is still at the centre of the governmentÕs democratic vision. Despite a period of perpetual constitutional reform, and persistent challenges to the practice of Westminster-based politics, the verdict remains that: ÔNew LabourÕs constitutional project cannot be interpreted as a fundamental paradigm shiftÕ (Flinders, 2005, 87) . The failure to make this ÔshiftÕ has variously been ascribed to a paucity of intellect, an absence of joined-up thinking, and an unwillingness to conceive of an Ôalternative constitutionÕ (see Smith, 2003, 591Ð593; Flinders, 2004, 143; Johnson, 2004, 308Ð309 ). Yet such criticisms do raise a fundamental question about what can realistically be expected of New Labour, or any party in government, to fashion an ÔalternativeÕ democratic vision. For, as argued elsewhere (Judge, 2005, 277Ð279) , the Westminster model still symbolises the elemental values of representation and accountability that serve as the prescriptions of legitimate government in the UK. The Westminster model retains its significance as an organising perspective in the sense of identifying a set of norms, values and meanings that legitimate the actions and interactions of state institutions. These might very well be idealised Ñ in their specification of a serial flow of legitimacy from the people through their elected representatives to an accountable and responsive executive. Nonetheless, these values and their institutional embodiment remain the Ôstem cellÕ of modern UK government.
More particularly this model Ôclearly distinguishes between participation and decision-making, and applies different rules to each it does [not] confuse the notion of fair consultation and participation with fair decision-making proceduresÕ (McHugh and Parvin, 2005, 17) . In fact, the distinctiveness of parliamentary representation is hermetically sealed in the Westminster model in the notion of parliamentary sovereignty Ñ which privileges representation based upon UK parliamentary elections above all other forms of representation and popular participation. This has been the central vision of all governments in the era of the mass franchise. This has also been the vision that has been obscured in the practice of Ôexecutive sovereigntyÕ and which has displayed the symptoms of Ômacular degenerationÕ.
What critics of the Westminster model tend to focus upon, therefore, is not the model itself but the challenges posed by ÔgovernanceÕ to the model, or the political practices that have been associated with the model: the accretion of power to the executive, the closed and exclusionary processes of decision making in the core executive, and the inversion of accountability. What New Labour has been reluctant to contemplate is the restitution of the democratic principles of the model, not least because the model has always been an idealised representation of parliamentary government (see Birch, 1964, 65, 74) . As a result, redress of the democratic imbalances and inversions of accountability between parliament and the executive have largely been blanked from the reformist vision of New Labour in government. The mutually reinforcing normsÑof party cohesion, party discipline, partisan risk-aversion, pathological antipathy to media criticism, collective notions of executive responsibility, closed and restricted modes of decision making Ñ provide for the incubation of macular degeneration.
The historic problem in the UK has been how to envisage such a rebalancing between legislature and executive given the blind spot at the centre of successive governmentsÕ institutional vision. The fundamental challenge has been, and remains, how to overcome the conundrum that the Ôdominant value systemÕ Ñ executive hegemony Ñ at the heart of the practice of the Westminster model needs to be redressed by executive action itself. New Labour, to date, in common with all of its post-war predecessors in government, has failed to address this conundrum. Yet, for those readers in need of a Ôhappy endingÕ, the period since 1997 has also witnessed the strengthening of potential Ônormative subsystemsÕ Ñ of Ôdeviant subculturesÕ Ñ which have challenged leadership policies and been prepared to infringe the norms of party discipline and voting cohesion in Westminster. In essence, these subcultures have emphasised collective (parliamentary) processes rather than majoritarian (executive) processes of decision-making. At their root these subcultures have a vision of representative processes focused beyond the executive, and provide, in essence, an ÔoppositionalÕ vision (whether of the formal opposition parties in Westminster, or of the Ôinformal oppositionÕ provided by ÔrebelsÕ within the Labour party itself, or of campaigning organisations beyond Westminster). These subcultures value effective representation, seek a rebalancing of executive and legislative power, and recognize that the stranglehold of conjoined party and executive leadership positions needs to be broken Ñ either through a concordat between the legislature and the executive (see Power Inquiry, 2006, 135Ð138); or more radically by electoral reformat Westminster (see Wright, 2004, 875; Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform, 2005) ; or more radically still through a formal separation of powers in a written constitution (see Allen, 2003, 70; Wright, 2004, 875) . The challenge is how to enable such a rebalancing between legislature and executive before the symptoms of macular degeneration afflict future majority party leaders on entering government in Westminster.9 Notes 1 The macular is the central part of the retina that is responsible for central vision and the ability to see in detail. Macular degeneration affects this central part of the retina and results in localised vision loss Ñ so generating a blind spot at the centre of vision, but without affecting peripheral vision. 2 In the draft new Civil Service Code this instruction was pared down to: ÔYou must not: disclose official information without authorityÕ (Cabinet Office, 2006, para 5) . 3 Lord Birt did eventually appear before the Public Administration Committee in April 2006, after he had left his position as the PMÕs Strategy Adviser. As Tony Wright, Chairman of the Committee observed, ÔIt has been lovely to see you. The sky would not have fallen in had you come to us when you were still in office. The sky will not fall in because you have come to us nowÕ (HC 756-iii, 2006, Q356) . In his evidence Lord Birt stuck rigidly to the Cabinet Office rules: ÔI am very happy to talk to the Committee about the sorts of issues that have been raised so far, namely the way in which government structures itself to address strategic questions, but I am afraid I do not want to go into any of the detail of my advice to the Prime Minister or the response to that adviceÕ (HC 756-iii, 2006, Q259) . 4 Notably the types of information requested by sections of the tabloid press included the number of windows at the Department of Education and Skills, the amount of money spent by departments on toilet paper, the cost of the PMÕs make-up since 1999, and the PMÕs guest list at . 7 Shephard and CairneyÕs findings reveal the complexity and contingency of relationships between the legislature and the executive in Scotland. They also present evidence of Ôpower-sharingÕ and support for the Ônew politics campÕ. 8 The focus of the following discussion is upon English local government. On local government and devolution see McConnell, 2004; Judge, 2005; Jeffery, 2006. 9 The last sentence of an article is perhaps an inappropriate place for speculation. If, however, macular degeneration is associated with ÔinsiderÕ status and holding conjoined party, legislative and executive leadership positions, the conundrumis how to inoculate ÔoutsidersÕ, in the transition into executive office, fromthe pathologies of executivementality. In other words, how is an ÔoutsiderÕ, oppositional perspective on the relationship between legislature and executive to be retained? In this sense, the fate of electoral reformfor Westminster elections is one critical test for macular degeneration; and it is a test that has produced negative results from successive governments. Yet, Gordon Brown Ñ after the 2005 election, in his position as heir-apparent to Tony Blair and PM-in-waiting (and also ÔoutsiderÕ to the Blair cabal) Ñ expressed his desire to shape a future constitutional settlement around a Ôcompact between the local and the national, and between the executive and the legislatureÕ (The Guardian, 27 February 2006) . In preparation for this settlement Mr Brown countenanced a Ôrenewed debate on issues from the role of parties and electoral reformÕ. BrownÕs positioning as an ÔoutsiderÕ within the executive may prove decisive in reducing the size of the institutional blind spot should he become PM. Alternatively, in the event of David Cameron becoming prime minister, there is some indication that the dominance of the executive and the adversarial nature of party competition would at least be recognised as inhibitions on democratic advance. In December 2005, Mr Cameron created a ÔDemocracy Task ForceÕ (www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def1/4democracy.taskforce.page). In June 2006, in a speech to the Power Inquiry Conference, he acknowledged that: ÔConsensus can be a good thingÕ. He went on to state: ÔI want to put Parliament at the centre of national life. I want to address the shift away from the legislature to the executive. We must remove the power of the executive to ride roughshod over the legislatureÕ (www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def1/4news.story.page&obj_id1/4129626).
